The policy world is awash with worries about spectrum shortages as demand for wireless services grows. Using data on more than 69,000 licenses from every FCC spectrum auction since 1996, this paper disentangles and quantifies major factors that differently contribute to license value. I find that, all else equal, flexible use licenses are significantly more valuable than licenses that proscribe certain uses, policy uncertainty depresses license value, and Verizon and AT&T pay more than other carriers for licenses. I also find that larger geographic definitions generally correlate with lower license values and, contrary to conventional wisdom, more bandwidth is not correlated with higher values. Finally, using auction data and information from large secondary trades, I find that spectrum prices have been increasing since the mid-2000s, though some evidence suggests that the rate of increase has been slowing. 1 I thank Corwin Rhyan for excellent research assistance,
Introduction
An explosion in wireless data transmission has led to concerns that sufficient spectrum is not available to keep up with this growth. As FCC Chairman Genachowski said, "demand for spectrum is rapidly outstripping supply." 2 In a purely economic sense, if markets function reasonably well, demand cannot exceed supply because prices will adjust appropriately. And since its first spectrum auctions in 1994, the FCC has made great strides in using market mechanisms as the primary tool for allocating spectrum to entities that value them the most. The FCC allocates available spectrum primarily through auctions and also encourages secondary spectrum markets so that as market conditions change, spectrum can continue to be deployed in high-valued ways.
A spectrum "crisis," presumably, would therefore be reflected in rapidly rising prices. However, as Peter Cramton once remarked, "spectrum isn't like pork bellies. Pork bellies are nice." 3 That is, spectrum is not a homogenous good, and its value depends on a myriad of factors, ranging from the physical characteristics of the spectrum, to the rules governing its use, to the behavior of users of neighboring bands.
Market actors take these factors into account when they bid for spectrum licenses either in auctions or in secondary markets. Unfortunately, auctions are relatively infrequent and while secondary markets are more robust than many believe, prices paid for license transactions are rarely public except in the case of the largest transactions. 4 As a result, it is difficult to observe spectrum prices directly and quantify either the recent "spectrum crunch" or how the different attributes of spectrum affect its value. This paper attempts to shed some light on those questions. In particular, it uses data from the FCC on all 69,000 licenses sold in spectrum auctions since 1996. This paper does not place specific values on spectrum, á la Bazelon and McHenry (2012) . 5 Instead, it disentangles the different attributes that make spectrum valuable. In particular, it asks how physical characteristics, institutions, demand, and technological change separately affect the value of spectrum licenses.
The analysis in this paper should help reveal which uses are relatively more valuable than others and by how much. To the extent that one use is more valuable than others, it may highlight economic gains that come from reallocating spectrum to that use or, better yet, simply removing use restrictions (other than those related to interference). If, for example, spectrum allocated to broadband services is more valuable than others, then, as Coleman Bazelon noted, "According to the Principle of Spectrum Reallocation, more licensed spectrum should be allocated to support mobile broadband services so long as any given band of spectrum is more valuable supporting mobile broadband services than in its current or other alternative uses." 6 My analysis supports some commonly-held assumptions regarding spectrum valuation. For example, licenses with paired spectrum and flexible-use licenses (especially those that allow broadband) are more valuable, and policy uncertainty depresses values. Other results question conventional wisdom: in terms of price per MHz-POP, licenses that cover larger areas seem to be less valuable than licenses that cover smaller areas, and licenses with more bandwidth do notall else equal-appear to be more valuable than others.
Finally, I find evidence that, all else equal, spectrum prices increased significantly from [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] , suggesting that spectrum is, in fact, becoming increasingly scarce in a relative sense, but the rate of increase in prices appears to be slowing. The FCC and NTIA should continue to move spectrum into the market and ensure that spectrum already available be able to move smoothly and efficiently through secondary transactions.
What Makes Spectrum Valuable?
The radio spectrum, the part of the electromagnetic spectrum used for communications ( Figure  1 ), is valuable because it is a key input into wireless services. Different bands of spectrum, however, have different physical characteristics that make them more and less appropriate for different applications. Demand for these different applications, the price of technologies that complement and substitute for spectrum, and the behavior of neighboring spectrum users underlie the value of the relevant spectrum bands. 7
Figure 1: Spectrum from Very Low Frequency to Cosmic Ray 8
We can usefully identify four categories of factors that affect spectrum value:
 Characteristics of the spectrum license itself, including the geography and population it covers and its frequency;
 Underlying demand for wireless services, for which spectrum is an input;  Institutional factors including the rules governing each license, such bandwidth size and usage rules; and  How technological change and innovation affect the extent to which spectrum is a substitute or a complement for other inputs into wireless service provision, such as cell splitting and spectrum sharing.
Physical characteristics
Of all the factors affecting value, spectrum's physical characteristics are the only ones that cannot change. Different frequencies are better suited to different applications. Common communications technologies typically use spectrum between 200 MHz and 3 GHz. 9 Frequencies above 3 GHz, called "super high frequency" (SHF, 3 -30 GHz) and "extremely high frequency" (EHF, above 30 GHz) tend to be used for microwave transmissions, satellite links, and services that use line-of-sight communication. 10 Within the 200 MHz -3 GHz "sweet spot," frequencies below 1 GHz tend to be favored for their better propagation characteristics, although this advantage is smaller in areas that require more transmitters and receivers to compensate for objects that block signals, like buildings.
The geographic area covered by a spectrum license affects its value. Most importantly, the population covered affects value because it is related to potential demand for wireless services. Additionally, economic activity and income of the region covered could affect license value, as could topographical features that influence the type of infrastructure needed to make wireless services work.
Geography is also an institutional factor, since the FCC decides on the license boundaries prior to auction. The FCC has used several geographic aggregations when defining licenses. 11 Defining the geographic boundaries of licenses is necessary to conduct an auction, and based on the intended services it is possible to guess which boundaries are sensible, but it is difficult for anyone to know precisely the most efficient definitions. As a result, the FCC has used a large number of different definitions. 12
Underlying Demand for Wireless Services
Regional population reflects potential consumers of wireless services and, thus, demand. But wireless demand is also a function of available services. Demand for wireless services is undeniably increasing, and is expected to continue to increase for the foreseeable future (see, for example, Figure 2 ). 
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Technological Change
Spectrum is a necessary, but not sufficient, input into wireless service provision. Wireless services also require transmitters, receivers, and other technologies to ensure that the devices stay connected and data transmissions are routed properly. They complement spectrum because higher demand, all else equal, requires more of these investments. However, they can also substitute for spectrum. More cell sites in a given area, for example, make it possible for more devices to connect to a network. Similarly, investments in technology like spectrum sharing allow any given slice of spectrum to be used more intensively.
As these technologies improve and become less costly, wireless providers will, all else equal, tend to rely on them more than on additional spectrum. The degree to which providers trade off investments in technology and infrastructure for spectrum depends on the relative prices of those inputs.
Institutions: Rules, Regulations, Auctions, and Firm Incentives
The value of a given swath of spectrum can be affected by a number of institutional features. Licenses define the rules under which spectrum can be used, and those rules affect the spectrum's value. 14 Similarly, auction rules can affect how much a provider is willing to pay for a license. There is not always a bright line between license rules and auction rules, but in general I classify license rules as those related to how the spectrum can be used, while auction rules relate to how the license is defined for the sake of conducting the auction. Additionally, each 13 Cisco Systems, Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2012 -2017 , February 6, 2013 , http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-520862.pdf. Data traffic projections, especially by those with an interest in selling equipment to handle that traffic, should be viewed cautiously. Nevertheless, few doubt that mobile data traffic will continue to increase. 14 More accurately, the rules affect how much value can be extracted from the spectrum.
bidder faces its own unique incentives and factors affecting how it values spectrum, such as existing spectrum holdings and cheaper access to capital.
License Rules and Regulations
Sometimes the FCC imposes restrictions or conditions on licenses in order to achieve policy goals. Generally speaking, the more restrictions a license includes, the less private value it has, although the rules could make the total social value higher or lower. Not all auctions have such specific requirements, but each license specifies allowed uses of the relevant spectrum.
Auction Rules
The purpose of auctions is to use market mechanisms to allow the licenses to go to the bidders who value them the most. However, the auctioneer-the FCC in this case-must still define precisely what is being auctioned and how and, as the FCC learned very early, the auction design can affect the outcome.
To facilitate the auction, the FCC typically defines the size of each license in MHz and in geographic area, trying to optimize these based on how it expects the licenses to be used. In addition to auction rules and procedures, which the FCC can set, macro-economic and policy expectations will affect bids to the extent that those expectations affect firms' projections of their future streams of revenue derived from the services they will provide on the spectrum.
Data
The FCC makes an enormous amount of data available on all 80 auctions it has conducted since 1994. 28 These data include, among other things, information about the spectrum itself and details of the licenses being auctioned including allowed services, auction details, and bidder names. 29 Table 1 shows the number of licenses on offer for each auction since 1994 and how many were sold. This analysis focuses on auctions beginning with Auction 8 for two reasons. First, the 1996 Telecommunications Act significantly changed telecommunications markets, meaning that bidder expectations in any given auction were probably much different after the Act passed. Additionally, in early auctions the FCC was still experimenting with very different auction rules, with some auctions-such as 2 and 5 discussed earlier-yielding what turned out to be abnormal results. Figure 3 shows the median winning bids in dollars per MHz-POP for auctions since 1996. Typically, auctions yielded prices between $0.01 and $0.10 per MHz-POP, although as the figure shows, some of the larger auctions yielded higher prices. Simple summary statistics, however, mask important differences across licenses. Instead of highlighting means and medians we want to disentangle the different elements of a license that affect spectrum value. In other words, as discussed above, the value of a spectrum license depends on the physical characteristics of the spectrum, the rules specified in the license, the available (and expected future) technologies that will make use of the spectrum, and underlying demand for wireless services. Each of these features can be quantified-some fairly precisely, and some only in ways that are not entirely satisfying. Additionally, the relevant variables do not necessarily neatly fit into a single category. Some of these variables, such as "population covered" are self-evident, but others, especially radiofrequency and "allowed uses," require additional explanation. I divide radiofrequency into three groups-less than 1 GHz, 1 -3 GHz, and above 3 GHz-because these commonly-used groupings reflect generally-accepted cutoffs regarding spectrum uses. Most common communications technologies use spectrum between 200 MHz and 3 GHz, so it makes sense to note which licenses are outside of that band. 30 Policy debates regarding spectrum allocation, meanwhile, often focus on spectrum below and above 1 GHz due to differing propagation characteristics, so it is sensible to attempt to determine how this difference affects valuation. 31
Placing allowed uses into well-defined categories is not simple. The FCC lists more than 100 radio service codes on its website. 32 That number, however, is somewhat misleading because not all codes are active and any given license may have multiple service codes. The FCC's Spectrum Dashboard, by contrast, shows a much smaller number of broader categories.
The Spectrum Dashboard categorizes allowed uses in two ways: "frequency purpose (tags)" and "radio service." 33 Any given license can have multiple frequency purpose tags but only a single radio service. An ideal way to show license use flexibility would be a Venn diagram showing all possible intersections of use tags. We lack the resources, however, to create a Venn diagram with nine sets. 35 Instead, we show Euler diagrams, which present only a subset of possible combinations.
In particular, we focus on mobile radio, phone, broadband, fixed wireless, and television frequency tags. We present this information two ways: first with the size of the rectangle indicating relative MHz-POP and again with the size of the rectangle indicating total amount spent on licenses with that combination of use tags.
We exclude licenses above 3 GHz from the figures because those licenses are in very high bands (e.g., 12 -31 GHz) in which large bandwidth is the norm-the bandwidth of these licenses averages 260 MHz and ranges from 80 MHz to 1.15 GHz. While we can control for those factors in the regression analysis below, they would dominate this graphical representation and make it difficult to see information for the more policy-relevant bands below 3 GHz. Figure 4 shows the Euler diagram for five frequency tags in MHz-POP and Figure 5 shows the diagram in total amount spent on licenses. The figures show that many licenses auctioned since 1996 allow multiple uses, especially broadband. This observation has implications for the empirical analysis. In particular, it may not be possible to identify the value of allowing broadband use, per se, as opposed to the value of license flexibility. I attempt to incorporate explicitly the concept of flexible use through a simple index variable, flexibility, which is simply the number of relevant service tags for each license.
The figures do, however, show the relative value of different license types. For example, Figure  4 shows that a comparable amount of spectrum (in MHz-POPs) was auctioned that allowed fixed but not mobile wireless and vice-versa. Figure 5 , however, shows that far more money was spent on spectrum that allowed mobile wireless, while spectrum that did not allow mobile wireless was far less attractive. Table 4 shows the distribution of the flexibility variable with and without paging licenses; because all paging licenses have only one tag (mobile radio), including paging skews the distribution towards less flexibility. Figure 6 illustrates how license flexibility has been changing 36 "T" appears by itself in Figure 5 but not Figure 4 because of the nature of the license: we know the total amount spent on these licenses but not the population covered.
MF BF F T MPBF MPBFT M MP
PBF
over time. The figure shows that, excluding paging licenses, the trend has been towards increased flexibility. 
Empirical Analysis
With these data I can examine how the different factors contribute to spectrum license value and glean some insights into quantifying the relative scarcity of spectrum.
In principle a hedonic approach will make it possible to disentangle spectrum's different attributes, but unsold licenses present a problem. The value of an unsold license is somewhere between zero and the FCC's reservation price. Unfortunately, we cannot observe that valuation. A left-censored tobit model becomes the appropriate empirical approach.
If the FCC has a reservation price (r i ), we observe the following for the dependent variable price per MHz-pop (p i ) for a given license:
where is a latent variable and a function of the factors comprising the value of the license:
f , 38 The FCC explains that it cannot "honor requests for special maps or additional service or interfering contours, or computations of area or population within these contours." http://transition.fcc.gov/mb/audio/includes/78-mapinfo.htm It is possible to download the contour shape files from the FCC and estimate the population inside them. Sadly, however, we do not have the resources to do that. 39 Their index, they explain, "averages several components that reflect the frequency of news media references to economic policy uncertainty, the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire in future years, and the extent of forecaster disagreement over future inflation and federal government purchases." Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, "Measuring Policy Uncertainty," October 10, 2011. The authors make up-to-date data available at www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/policyuncertainty.zip.
I estimate two sets of regressions. The first set of regressions uses the entire sample of licenses, controlling for the different usage rules of each license. The second uses only those licenses that allow wireless broadband. In particular, the second includes auctions the FCC classified as 700 MHz, 700 MHz guard band, PCS, Cellular, or AWS-1. 40 Table 5 shows the results of the tobit analysis. This section discusses the more noteworthy of these results.
Empirical Results and Discussion
Population
Whether analyzing all licenses or just broadband licenses, the size of the population covered by the license is positively and statistically significantly correlated with license value. At first blush this result seems sensible and intuitive since population is probably the best determinant of demand at any given point in time. Recall, however, that the dependent variable-price per MHz-pops-already incorporates population.
This result, therefore, suggests that the total price paid for a license increases more with population. If each person is worth the same amount as an actual or potential customer, then price per MHz-pop should not change regardless of the number of people. Consider, for example, two areas A and B where B has twice the population of A, and a 1 MHz license sells for $1 per MHz-pop in area A. The total price of that license would be $population(A). Assuming A and B are similar except for population we would expect price per MHz-pop to remain constant and an identical license in area B to sell for $2*population(A), since population(B) = 2*population(A).
The empirical results, however, suggest this is not the case. Instead, price per MHz-pop itself increases with population. This result is consistent with at least two (related) explanations.
First, auction participants should base their bids on the expected stream of revenues from using a given license, and these expected revenues depend not just on demand today, but on future demand. The population result suggests that, on average, winning bidders expect greater potential revenue growth in areas with larger populations. Second, larger populations likely proxy for areas with more economic activity-not simply because they have more people, but because larger groups of economic actors can create agglomeration effects. 41 So, for example, the New York metropolitan area has a Gross Domestic State Product about 13 times as large as the Kansas City metropolitan area even though its population is only about 9 times as large. 42
40 These categories include auctions number 10, 11, 12, 22, 33, 35, 38, 44, 45, 49, 58, 60, 66, 71, 73, 77, 78, and 92. 41 
Bandwidth and Frequency
Conventional wisdom holds that more bandwidth in a given license is more valuable, since more bandwidth increases the range of services an operator can provide as well as the relative usable area since more contiguous bandwidth means fewer opportunities for interference. Yet, the results are not consistent with that view. Instead, the results suggest that, all else equal, more bandwidth is correlated with lower private valuations for spectrum.
One possible explanation is that despite the large number of controls, the analysis may have certain omitted variables related to allowed uses and bandwidth. For example, Auction 30 involved 100 MHz licenses in the 39 GHz band. The most valuable commercial services do not operate in that frequency, and those licenses sold for less than a penny per MHz-pop. Yet, this explanation is not especially satisfying since the result holds even for the broadband-only auctions.
Another possible explanation is that the more bandwidth a license includes, the longer it will be before the provider actually needs to "light" all of its spectrum. Under this scenario, bidders will discount the value of the spectrum based on how long it will be before they can begin to earn a return on it.
Several filings to the FCC and the Commission itself have noted that sub-1 GHz frequencies are more valuable than other frequencies. 43 The results lend weak support for that bit of conventional wisdom. Evaluating all licenses together yields no robust results on the question of frequency-the coefficients depend on the empirical specification. The results on the broadbandonly analysis, however, suggest that, for broadband at least, spectrum below 1 GHz is, all else equal, more valuable than spectrum above 1 GHz.
Pairing
The analysis shows that licenses with paired spectrum are more valuable than those without, all else equal. This result is consistent with research done by Coleman Bazelon. 44 The statisticallysignificant correlation suggests that, all else equal and evaluated at the mean, paired spectrum is about twice as valuable in price per MHz-pop as unpaired spectrum.
Usage Rules
Not surprisingly, usage rules affect the value of licenses. Column (1) of Table 5 shows the analysis with uses categorized according to the unique combinations of frequency use tags discussed above (Figure 4 ). Licenses that allow broadband-especially the Broadband-Fixed Wireless combination-are the most valuable. The least valuable are licenses that allow only television broadcasting, followed by licenses that allow only paging. These results are sensibleas services are increasingly all digital and delivered over IP network it makes increasingly less sense to have spectrum devoted to specific (and dying) services. Intriguingly, licenses that also allow phone and television as well as broadband and fixed wireless (PBFT) are also significantly less valuable than the broadband-fixed wireless combination. This result, however, is an artifact of the empirical specification. Ninety-nine percent of the 2,193 PBFT licenses are in the 700 MHz spectrum, meaning that the sub-1 GHz indicator variable also applies. 45 The two coefficients are of similar magnitude, essentially cancelling each other out. 46 Other specifications confirm the relatively higher value of broadband licenses. The coefficient on the broadband use tag is positive and significant, while television and safety are negative, statistically significant, and large in magnitude.
Similarly, flexibility is generally valuable. Licenses that allow broadband are generally flexible-every license (in this database) that allows broadband also allows at least one other use. The median and mean number of other uses for licenses that allow broadband is three. The analysis shows that flexibility-as measured by the number of allowed uses-is positively and significantly correlated with license value.
The coefficient on the "safety" variable shows that licenses designated for public safety have significantly lower private value than those with other uses. One should interpret this result carefully since it shows only the private value and not the net social value. It is conceivable that although public safety licenses are not worth much to private investors, their social value could be much higher.
Geographic Types
The FCC defines the geographic regions for licenses in each auction based on its expectations regarding how licenses will be used and how the regional definitions will contribute to a smoothfunctioning auction. The most valuable grouping appears to be Basic Trading Areas (BTAs) 47 or Designated Market Areas (DMAs) 48 , depending on the specification. The least valuable grouping is nationwide licenses. While the precise order of value by region differs by specification, regardless of specification the analysis reveals a clear negative correlation between the size of the region specified by the license and the revealed private value of the license (Figure 7) . 45 The remaining 93 licenses were in Auction 86, for BRS licenses in the 1-3GHz band. 46 The coefficient on the 3+ GHz indicator is also positive, partially cancelling out the negative effect of the television licenses, many of which were above 3 GHz. However, the magnitude of the positive coefficient on this indicator is much smaller than the magnitude of the negative coefficient on the television indicator. 47 http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/maps/bta.pdf 48 DMAs are generally media markets. In general, this result is understandable. Nationwide licenses include low-value areas, meaning the bidder must purchase areas in which it has little interest as well as high-value areas. Smaller geographic definitions allow bidders to more selectively bid on areas they value. As the figure shows, nationwide licenses are, by far, the least valuable, although that may be partly due to the types of services offered on those licenses to the extent that the regression does not control for those factors. Nevertheless, even excluding the nationwide coefficient a negative correlation remains between population and license value, although it is weaker.
Policy Uncertainty
The Baker, Bloom, Davis policy uncertainty index discussed earlier is negatively correlated with license value, statistically significant, and large in magnitude: each point increase in the index is correlated with a decrease in price per MHz-pop one $0.01 (for all licenses) to $0.08 (for broadband only licenses). This correlation seems improbably large given that the index ranges from 70 to 330 over this time period.
Nevertheless, the sign of the coefficient is consistent with the well-understood point that investment depends, in part, on how much investors believe that relevant rules-regardless of what they are-will remain stable. This index is based heavily on macro-economic uncertainty measures, and those are beyond the power of the FCC to affect. In addition to overall policy uncertainty, it is not too much of a stretch to believe that uncertainty regarding relevant regulations or how credibly the FCC can commit to a set of rules will also affect how much firms are willing to bid for licenses.
Carriers
In addition to common factors all bidders face such as spectrum characteristics and license rules, each bidder faces its own incentives and factors affecting how it values spectrum. For example, some may have cheaper access to capital, allowing them to bid more at relatively lower cost than rivals, while existing spectrum holdings may affect how much a given carrier values a new swath of spectrum on the auction block.
The analysis includes indicators for AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, Sprint, MetroPCS, Leap, US Cellular, and everyone else as a single group. 49 The analysis finds that, on average, Verizon pays more than other bidders for spectrum, with AT&T and MetroPCS paying the second-highest prices, followed by T-Mobile, US Cellular, Leap, and everyone else. Figure 8 shows these coefficient results. 50 AT&T is the baseline because it was the excluded indicator variable. Bar shows coefficient on carrier dummy variable from specification using unique frequency use-tag combinations. Line shows 95 percent confidence interval. 49 Identifying the bidders is not simple. Each carrier may bid using several names due to past mergers, acquisitions, partnerships, and name changes. For example, US Cellular has bid under the name "Barat Wireless," "Carroll Wireless," and others. 50 The figure excludes Sprint because it has not participated in a spectrum auction since 1997. The broadband-only analysis is similar, except that in this case Verizon and AT&T do not appear to pay significantly different prices from each other (Figure 9 ). T-Mobile, Leap, US Cellular, MetroPCS, and everyone else have paid less than AT&T (and Verizon) for licenses that allow broadband. The results suggest that AT&T and Verizon value incremental spectrum more than do other carriers, all else equal. What might explain this difference? Two competing, though not mutually exclusive, hypotheses offer potential answers.
The first hypothesis is that spectrum is valuable to AT&T and Verizon because although they are the leading networks in terms of the number of subscribers, coverage, and (generally) technology they have relatively little spectrum in terms of MHz per subscriber. When normalizing spectrum holdings that way, it is sensible that additional spectrum on the margin is more valuable to them than it is to others. Figure 10 lends support to this hypothesis. Firms with more spectrum per subscriber tend to pay less for spectrum than firms with less spectrum per subscriber. The second hypothesis is that AT&T and Verizon value additional spectrum not just because it is necessary to provide services, but because each MHz of spectrum they control is a MHz of spectrum a competitor does not control. That is, under this foreclosure hypothesis, AT&T and Verizon derive extra value from spectrum because keeping it away from competitors makes it more difficult to compete. 52
Testing the foreclosure hypothesis is difficult because it is not obvious what the auction price in the absence of foreclosure "should" be. If other potential bidders believe they have no chance of outbidding Verizon or AT&T for spectrum then they would be unlikely to enter the bidding in the first place. Under that scenario we would probably expect the two biggest carriers to spend less per MHz-POP than others because there would be fewer bidders in the auction, but we know the opposite is true-they spend more than others.
Another possibility-consistent with higher prices paid by AT&T and Verizon-is that the two carriers offer very high bids to signal to others the futility of continuing to bid in the auction. We would then probably expect auctions won by AT&T or Verizon to conclude in fewer rounds than Price paid for spectrum relative to AT&T other auctions, either due to fewer initial bidders or large opening bids by AT&T or Verizon as a signal regarding their determination to win. 53 Figure 11 , however, shows that the presence of AT&T and Verizon in an auction does not tend to diminish the auction competition in terms of number of rounds to completion. In other words, the claim that participation by the two largest providers dampens auction competition appears to be false. 54
Figure 11: Mean Number of Rounds in Auctions for Licenses that Allow Broadband by Auction Winner
In sum, at the end of the day we are left with the information that AT&T and Verizon pay more than others, all else equal, for their spectrum, some evidence in favor of the efficiency hypothesis and some evidence against a component of the foreclosure hypothesis. However, there is no way to rule out or in either completely.
Prices and a Spectrum Crunch
If the analysis controlled for all other factors affecting the private value of spectrum licenses, then the remaining year effects should reveal the net effect of demand and technological change on private spectrum value. However, the analysis above cannot accurately identify price because each auction tends to occur within a particular year. As a result, in some cases the year fixed effects capture price changes, but other times they reflect differences between the type of licenses being sold for which the model does not otherwise control. So, for example, the 53 The degree to which this type of action is possible depends in part on the auction rules. For example, after the 2008 AWS auction the FCC changed the auction rules to make this kind of signaling more difficult. Additionally, Bulow, Levin, and Milgrom (2009) point out that so-called "jump bidding" may be used for reasons other than signaling, such as to gain some control over the auction. Jeremy Bulow, Jonathan Levin, and Paul Milgrom, "Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions" (Stanford, CA, February 2009), http://www.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Papers/AWS.pdf. 54 Another problem with the foreclosure mechanisms discussed above is that the FCC designs its auctions to minimize that type of behavior. For example, the FCC sometimes uses blind bidding so that any given bidder does not know who the other bidders are, although with certain large auctions it may be inherently obvious who the bidders are. coefficient on the 2011 dummy variable partly captures the price effect, but also captures Auction 92 effect, especially in the broadband-only equation where it is not possible to otherwise control for radio service.
The model therefore must be changed slightly for the purposes of estimating price changes. This section focuses more explicitly on the price index 55 and compares the results to those we can observe in secondary market trades.
The simplest difference from the above analysis is that hedonic price index is typically constructed as a log-linear model rather than a linear model, making it easier to interpret the coefficient on the year dummy variables as percent changes in price.
56 Additionally, estimating a single equation with multiple year dummy variables (the pooled method) as above constrains the other coefficients to remain constant across years, which may not be justified. Instead, the "adjacent period dummy variable approach" allows all coefficients to vary across years by estimating separate equations for each adjacent year pairs.
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Most importantly, however, licenses are probably too heterogeneous to make year-to-year comparisons meaningful, as evidenced by the unrealistic magnitude of the estimated price changes from the above regressions. For example, 700 MHz and, say, paging licenses are probably too different to pool together, even when controlling for their radio service code. Even 700 MHz and AWS-1 licenses may be too different to pool. Separate models for paging, 700 MHz, AWS-1, and so on will be more realistic than pooling them and trying to control for their different characteristics.
Taking into account the above comments, I estimate log-linear adjacent-period fixed effects models separately for each radio service. Because not all radio services are represented in each auction, adjacent periods can be several years apart.
The advantage of the radio service-specific, adjacent-year approach is that it yields a much cleaner, apples-to-apples comparison of changes in license values since the approved uses are close to identical. 58 The disadvantages is that the analysis has no common base year on which to construct a single spectrum price index, although I present some estimates of a plausible consolidated index under different assumptions.
I don't present the full regression results here. Instead, I present just the radio service-specific results. 58 "Radio services," available on the FCC Spectrum Dashboard, are not the same as the full list of radio service codes (http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls/index.htm?job=radio_services). Thus, it is likely that some licenses categorized as a particular "radio service" here may include somewhat different collection of radio service codes. Got that? No? Welcome to the world of spectrum licenses.
was possible to estimate a price index, percentage price increase based on the hedonic regression, the index, and a graphical representation of the index. Close inspection of the table shows why a hedonic model is different from simply looking at price changes. Consider the 700 MHz radio service, for example. Licenses in the much smaller 2011 auction sold for $0.56 per Mhz-POP compared to $1.10 in the 2008 auction. Simply looking at those prices would lead one to conclude that the spectrum sold for half as much in 2011 as in 2008. Controlling for factors that affect license value, like the nature of the geographic areas covered by these licenses, suggests that, instead, the price almost doubled.
The different years for which it is possible to estimate these indices makes it difficult to compare across radio service code. To facilitate this comparison, Figure 12 shows the price indices for the five radio services whose auction revenues totaled at least $500 million. 59 The figure shows that radio service prices do not move together. Among the services pictured, the value of the 700 MHz spectrum increased the most-about 30 percent annually between 2008 and 2011. Licenses designated for wireless cable, a service that did not become popular, showed the biggest price decrease among those pictured. 59 The $500 million cutoff is arbitrary, but adding more radio services made the figure increasingly complicated while the marginal increase in information arguably decreases as auction revenues decrease. Figure 12 also highlights the inherent difficulties in using auction data to develop price indices. Because auctions are relatively infrequent and auctions of any given spectrum type even more infrequent, any single index would be dominated by different types of spectrum in different years. For example, the most recent auction price data come from the relatively small 2011 auction of 700 MHz spectrum, which the hedonic model estimates reflects about a 28 percent annual increase since the 2008 auction.
Despite these shortcomings, it is possible to combine these estimates into a single index, though the result should be taken as illustrating trends rather than specific price changes. Figure 13 combines the above estimates by weighting the estimated annual changes by the amount of spectrum (in MHz-POPs) involved. This approach leads to certain oddities in the figure, such as a spike in 1999 suggesting a 125 percent price increase, which is an artifact of the one time the price of auctioned wireless cable spectrum increased. While the number for any given year should be interpreted only after carefully considering its foundation in Table 6 , Figure 13 illustrates two general points. First, spectrum prices appeared to dip after 2001 and the dot-com and technology market collapse. Second, beginning sometime around 2005 prices recovered and have increased each year since.
As discussed above, analysis based on secondary trades would yield a more precise price index by comparing changes in the price of individual licenses over time. 60 While the FCC records license ownership information, it does not record the price of the thousands of such trades made each year. The only price data routinely publicly available is for very large transactions. Estimating changes from large transactions, like auction data, is also problematic in certain ways. Most importantly, the trade may not be strictly cash-for-spectrum, but may involve other exchanges or agreements whose value is difficult to quantify.
Despite the problems with large secondary trades, they add important information to the question of changes in spectrum value. The 2013 spectrum trade between AT&T and Verizon shows the value and difficulty in evaluating secondary trades. In this transaction, Verizon sold about 495 million MHz-POPs of 700 MHz spectrum to AT&T in exchange for $1.9 billion and 243 million MHz-POPs of AWS-1 spectrum. Craig Moffett estimates that this trade yielded a 4.1 percent annual return to Verizon on spectrum it acquired in 2008, far lower than the 28 percent annual return estimated for [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] 
Figure 14: Major Trades of 700 MHz and AWS Spectrum Licenses
The various methodological approaches and data used in this paper provide plausible bounds on the true change in spectrum prices. Between 2010 and early 2013 estimates of annualized changes range from about 4 percent to around 30 percent. We can, therefore, safely conclude that spectrum prices have been increasing, but not precisely by how much. 63 As a final exercise, it is worth consolidating the results to the extent possible. Figure 15 shows annualized returns, weighted by MHz-POPs for the year of auction or resale. It is encouraging to note that the auction and resale methods show similar trends. If these estimates are to be believed, spectrum prices began increasing in the mid-2000s, with the rate of increase peaking in 2007 or 2008, and returning to single digit increases by late 2012-early 2013.
Figure 15: Summary of Price Changes Derived From Auctions and Secondary Trades
These results come with caveats. First, as the large estimated range suggests, each type of analysis has its own strengths and weaknesses as discussed ad nauseum above. Second, each carrier faces a unique situation. Some carriers may, for example, have a pressing need for additional AWS spectrum and little need for 700 MHz spectrum, or vice-versa.
Second, the hedonic analysis here is a reduced-form model and largely assumes the auction and usage rules are exogenous. That is, it assumes that the FCC sets the rules and then bidders decide how much licenses are worth to them as if the bidders were simply economic actors in a typical market. The reality is not so simple.
The reality is that the FCC does not set auction rules, bandplans, or use rules in a vacuum. Instead, as it prepares for an auction it issues a Notice of Inquiry, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and possibly Further Notices of Proposed Rulemaking, and finally an Order describing the final rules. Every actor with a (real or perceived) interest in the auction submits comments and meets with regulatory officials when possible. The Commission then does its best to set rules that it believes will be facilitate an efficient market-like outcome. In other words, the license rules are partly endogenous to the price paid. That said, it is not immediately obvious how this particular endogeneity affects the results.
Conclusion
This paper disentangles and quantifies the factors affecting private spectrum value, and measures changes in prices over time. I find that flexible-use licenses are significantly more valuable than licenses that dictate specific allowed uses and that policy uncertainty depresses license value. I also find evidence that, all else equal, license prices increased steadily since about 2007, suggesting that demand for wireless services has been outpacing improvements in technological efficiency. However, the range of estimated change is large-between 4 and 30 percent annually for 2011 and 2012 and the rate of price increase has probably been slowing. Whether or not spectrum values justify the moniker "crisis," the results emphasize the economic costs of artificially restricting the supply or use of spectrum, the complex interplay of factors that affect spectrum license value, and the importance of making long-term credible regulatory commitments.
Upper 700 MHz Guard Bands
By Congressional direction, the Commission reallocated thirty-six megahertz of spectrum for commercial use including fixed, mobile, and broadcasting services. Six of the thirty-six megahertz were Guard Bands to protect public safety users. Guard band equipment must meet ACCP OOBE criteria and users must comply with frequency coordination procedures. Entities that employ a cellular system architecture are prohibited from operating in this band. The 24 GHz Radio Service can be used for any kind of digital fixed communications service consistent with Commission rules. Services can be provided on a common carrier or non-common carrier basis.
Automated Maritime Telecommunications Service
A specialized system of coast stations providing integrated and interconnected marine voice and data communications, somewhat like a cellular phone system, for tugs, barges, and other vessels on waterways. Service to units on land is permitted, so long as marineoriginating communications receive priority. 
